Authenticated data storage on an untrusted platform is an important computing paradigm for cloud applications ranging from big-data outsourcing, to cryptocurrency and certificate transparency log. These modern applications increasingly feature update-intensive workloads, whereas existing authenticated data structures (ADSs) designed with in-place updates are inefficient to handle such workloads. In this paper, we address this issue and propose a novel authenticated log-structured merge tree (eLSM) based key-value store by leveraging Intel SGX enclaves. We present a system design that runs the code of eLSM store inside enclave. To circumvent the limited enclave memory (128 MB with the latest Intel CPUs), we propose to place the memory buffer of the eLSM store outside the enclave and protect the buffer using a new authenticated data structure by digesting individual LSM-tree levels. We design protocols to support query authentication in data integrity, completeness (under range queries), and freshness. The proof in our protocol is made small by including only the Merkle proofs at selective levels.
INTRODUCTION
Authenticated data storage on an untrusted platform is an important computing paradigm for secure cloud applications including database outsourcing, Blockchain databases [46, 90, 94, 87] , certificate transparency log databases [4, 60] , etc. These modern applications increasingly feature write-intensive workloads, as contents are often generated by users in big-data scenarios (see target applications and workloads in § 3.1).
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the protocols of authenticated data structures (ADSs) between an untrusted cloud server and trusted clients (i.e., data owner and query users). However, existing ADS schemes [86, 58, 68, 69, 96, 45, 65, 55, 66, 92, 93] have several major limitations. First, they are designed based on update-in-place structures (i.e., requiring excessive communication and large proofs between the data owner and the cloud for updating the ADS), leading to known inefficiency problems in handling data updates [67, 73] . Second, existing schemes require the query users to verify the proof of results obtained from the cloud, which incurs high bandwidth and computation overheads at the query clients.
To address these limitations, in this paper, we leverage off-the-shelf hardware enclaves, in particular Intel Software Guard eXtension (SGX) [12] , and propose a novel authenticated key-value store based on LSM trees. The motivation of our design is two-fold: 1. (Why LSM tree?) An LSM tree (log-structured merge tree) is a data structure that supports append-only writes and random-access data reads. Periodically, it conducts a batch operation, called COMPACTION, that reorganizes the data layout for better read performance in the future. By this design, an LSM tree has performance advantages in serving high-speed write streams and is widely adopted as the external-memory index structure in many modern storage systems including Google's BigTable [42] /LevelDB [10] , Facebook RocksDB [9] , Apache HBase [2] , Apache Cassandra [1] (see § 2.1 for details). 2. (Why Intel SGX?) Conventionally, LSM trees are not adopted in the construction of ADS schemes because of the overhead associated with verifiable COMPACTION computation. In a typical ADS setting where trusted parties including data owners and users are remote to the untrusted cloud server, constructing verifiable COMPACTION computation implies either the use of expensive verifiable computation (VC) protocols [32, 70, 79, 39, 89] or transferring bulk data being merged across the Internet. With the advent of commercial trusted execution environments, notably Intel Software Guard eXtension or SGX [12] , it is possible to build a trusted execution environment or enclave in proximity to the untrusted cloud platform. This makes bulk data transfer feasible and should be promising to support verifiable and efficient COMPACTION for authenticated LSM trees. In addition, the query users can be alleviated from the burden of result verification.
In our envisioned architecture, trusted cloud applications (e.g., a database server) run inside SGX enclaves and issue data read/write requests to our authenticated key-value store that is co-located in the cloud. Our system design is following: The enclave runs the codebase of an LSM store 1 and relies on existing Library OS (LibOS) for handling system calls, such as Haven [35] , Graphene [88] and Intel SGX SDK [16] . We study a challenging issue of data placement with enclave. A naive design by placing data inside the enclave puts huge pressure on the enclave memory of limited size (i.e., the latest family of Intel CPUs support 128 MB physical memory in the enclave), incurring expensive enclave paging [64] . In our performance study, the overhead causes slowdown of more than two orders of magnitudes (See § 4.2 for details). To circumvent the inefficiency, we propose to place the memory data outside the enclave. More precisely, among various memory data structures in an LSM store, we place the read buffer outside the enclave and leave other structures that often grow sublinearly with the data size inside the enclave, including index structures (e.g., a bloom filter), write buffer, etc.
To ensure the integrity of the data outside the enclave, we propose an authenticated LSM tree, named by eLSM. eLSM builds a forest of Merkle trees, each digesting a "level" in an LSM tree (see the preliminary of an LSM tree in § 2.1). eLSM supports efficient reads and small-sized query proofs by presenting Merkle proofs at selective levels. We have proved the security of the query authentication schemes in eLSM (in § 5. 3.1) .
We also present the implementation of eLSM in Google LevelDB [10] and Facebook RocksDB [9] . In our implementation, the eLSM Merkle proofs are embedded in individual data records in such a way that the proof of a query can be naturally constructed from the Merkle proofs embedded in the data records included in the query result. By this means, we minimize the code change needed in Google LevelDB, reducing performance interference at runtime. For RocksDB, we leverage its callback functions [5] and implement authenticated COMPACTION as a handler to some events in the COMPACTION path. With this, we believe our design of eLSM is generally applicable to any LSM stores.
We conduct a comprehensive performance study of eLSM under the YCSB workload benchmark [44] . The performance result shows that eLSM achieves lower operation latency than the baseline of update-in-place data structures by more than one order of magnitudes. Comparing with the eLSM design with memory buffers in the enclave, the memory placement outside the enclave achieves up to 4.5X speedup in most YCSB workloads.
The contributions made in this paper include the following: 1. This paper addresses the emerging application need of supporting query authentication in the presence of frequent data updates. We propose a novel SGX-enabled authenticated key-value store.
2. We present the system designs of eLSM that are secure, efficient and generic. It places the memory data outside the enclave to circumvent the limited memory size in the enclave. It builds an authenticated LSM tree with small query proofs at selective tree levels.
3. We implemented functional prototypes of eLSM on Google LevelDB and Facebook RocksDB. With minimal code change in LevelDB and RocksDB, the system implementation is generally applicable to other LSM stores. The code of our prototype is open-sourced [20] . We also conducted a comprehensive performance study under the YCSB workload benchmark that shows up to 4.5X performance advantage.
PRELIMINARIES
This section presents the preliminaries of related techniques to 1 "LSM store" denotes the class of key-value stores designed based on LSM trees. this work.
LSM Tree-based Storage Systems
Data structure: A log-structured merge tree or LSM tree [63] is a data structure that organizes a dataset by so-called levels. A level is a collection of key-value records that are written in a time of proximity. Inside a level, it stores a sorted run of records, first ordered by data keys and then by time. Upon a write, an LSM tree stores it in the first level. The first level is thus a mutable data structure updated by individual data writes. Upon a read, it searches the tree by iterating through levels and finds the record that matches the queried data key. Periodically, normally at an offline time, the LSM tree runs a COMPACTION operation that merges sorted runs in adjacent levels, to make room in lower levels 2 for upcoming writes and to facilitate reads in the future. An LSM tree consists of totally q levels, which are L0, L1, ....
Storage systems: LSM trees have been recently adopted in the design of many modern storage systems, including Google BigTable [42] /LevelDB [10] , Apache HBase [2] , Apache Cassandra [1] , Facebook RocksDB [9] , etc. In these systems, the LSM tree is adopted as an external-memory data structure that manages disk IOs. Specifically, the LSM tree buffers the first-level data in memory (stored in the MemTable structure) and, through the COMPACTION operation, stores data at higher levels on disk. The data stored in MemTable is backed up by a log file on disk, named Write-Ahead Log or WAL. Data records are written to disk in a large data unit (e.g., several megabytes). Each data unit is persisted in a so-called SSTable file (Sorted Strings Table [42, 10, 9] ). By this means, random-access writes are buffered in memory and the system causes only sequential writes to disk.
The LSM tree is also used as a primary index in the key-value store system. An SSTable is a file consisting of multiple data blocks. To support fast data reads in an SSTable, there is a compact B+ tree that indexes the different data blocks in the SSTable. In addition, a Bloom filter is built for each data block that indexes the records in the block. A Bloom filter can facilitate the case when the queried key is not found in the block.
In terms of performance, the LSM-tree based storage design represents a middle ground between the two classic designs, that is, the read-optimized update-in-place storage (e.g., B+ tree and many database indices [47, 83] ) and the write-optimized log-structured storage (e.g., log-structured file systems [75] ). On the one hand, an LSM tree (in an external memory model) serves data writes in an append-only fashion, in a way similar to log-structured file systems. On the other hand, it supports random-access reads without scanning the entire dataset, which is similar to update-in-place style B+ trees. An LSM tree reaps the benefits from both worlds, at the expense of assuming some offline hours to do the batched compaction operation.
Software Guard eXtension (SGX)
Intel SGX is a security-oriented x86-64 ISA extension on the Intel Skylake CPU, released in 2015. SGX provides a "security-isolated world" for trustworthy program execution on an otherwise untrusted hardware platform. At the hardware level, the SGX's trusted world or enclave includes a tamper-proof SGX CPU which automatically encrypts memory accesses upon cache write-backs. Programs executed outside the enclave trying to access enclave memory only get to see the ciphertext and cannot succeed. At the software level, the SGX enclave includes only some unprivileged program and excludes any OS kernel code, by explicitly prohibiting system services (e.g., system calls) inside the enclave.
To use the technology, a client initializes an enclave by uploading her program to the server host and uses SGX's seal and attestation mechanism [29] to verify the correct setup of the enclave environment (i.e., the binding between the client's program and a genuine SGX CPU). During the program execution, the enclave can be entered and exited proactively (by SGX instructions, e.g., EENTER and EEXIT) or passively (by interrupts or traps). These world-switch events trigger the context saving/reloading in both hardware and software levels. Comparing prior TEE solutions [17, 24, 3, 11] , SGX uniquely supports multi-core concurrent execution, dynamic paging, and interrupted execution.
The software built on SGX relies on an underlying "RPC" mechanism to switch the execution between the enclave and untrusted world. In SGX SDK, such RPC mechanism is supported by ECall/OCall where in the case of an ECall (OCall), the untrusted host (enclave) switches to enclave (the untrusted host) in order to call a function there. Alternatively, one can use the LibOS supports in enclave to load and run unmodified application software in enclave. There are existing research prototypes for enclave LibOS, such as Haven [35] , Graphene [31] , and SCONE [31] .
SGX storage and costs: In SGX, there is a reserved region of main memory where the CPU stores data encrypted and authenticated. This CPU-protected region of memory, called PRM, is small and in current Intel CPU, the size is limited to 128 MB. The SGX architecture supports a virtual memory in enclave of arbitrary size. When the data stored in enclave virtual memory is larger than 128 MB, it causes the event of "enclave paging", that is, the hardware will transfer the data between untrusted main memory and the protected memory region (PRM). The enclave paging is expensive as the process involves asynchronous enclave exit (i.e., AEX), OS-managed page table, and SGX instructions (i.e., EWB) to evict a victim page to remap the requested page. This enclave paging event can easily become the system bottleneck when the application has a working set larger than 128 MB.
Merkle Hash Trees
A Merkle Hash Tree (or MHT) [61] is a method of digesting and authenticating a dataset. Specifically, given an array of data records, a Merkle tree's leaf set consists of the hashes of all data records. The non-leaf node in a Merkle tree is the hash of the concatenation of the children of this node. The root hash of the Merkle tree digests the entire data array with records in the fixed order. Merkle trees are often used in constructing a proof system between a verifier and a prover. Given a query over a dataset, a Merkle proof consists of all hashes of the tree nodes surrounding the path from the leaf (that matches the query) to the root. Hence, it is also called Merkle authentication path. When the Merkle tree is built over a sorted dataset, the Merkle proof can be used to authenticate the membership and non-membership of a query result in the dataset. In particular, when there is no matching record to the query, the Merkle proof for non-membership consists of the two authentication paths respectively for the two records immediately larger and smaller than the queried data.
RESEARCH FORMULATION
This section formulates the research by presenting the target application and workloads, system model, security goals and design motivation of eLSM.
Motivating Scenarios
To motivate our goal, we describe two popular application scenarios that emphasize the need of serving and storing write-intensive, security-sensitive big-data. A1) Big-data outsourcing to the cloud: Suppose a Twitter-alike startup company wants to outsource the storage of tweets to a third-party cloud (e.g., for economic reasons). The cloud storage service stores outsourced tweet database and serves two types of user operations: 1) data writes or updates as social-network users post new tweets, 2) data reads when a user reads her friends' tweets or when the startup company wants to analyze the tweets stream in real time for mining trendy stories (e.g., the "Moments" page in the Twitter website).
A2) Cryptocurrency and Blockchain: In today's cryptocurrency, buyers and sellers submit transactions to the Blockchain, which is a third-party storage system storing the transaction history. The transaction storage can be materialized in a large-scale P2P network (i.e., public Blockchains such as Bitcoin [19] and Ethereum [6] ) or in a consortium of a relatively small number of players (i.e., private Blockchains such as HyperLedger [18] and multichain [21] ). The storage workloads imposed on Blockchain are 1) an intensive stream of data writes caused by transactions continuously submitted by a large number of buyers/sellers, and 2) data reads for auditing the transaction history when new transactions need to be validated (e.g., to avoid double spending) or when new joining Blockchain nodes synchronize their states (e.g., in a simplified payment verification or SPV client [22] who selectively reads the chain state).
Application workloads: As can be seen, the application scenarios feature a workload of intensive small writes and random-access reads. The data writes arrive at a large volume and at a fast speed. A read query selectively retrieves a small part of the dataset and it causes random accesses to the data-storage medium.
The write-intensive workload excludes conventional database storage engines that are designed based on update-in-place data structures (e.g., B+ trees). In update-in-place structures, a data update needs to overwrite the previous version of the record at the exact location where the record is stored. An update incurs lookups and random-accesses of the record's previous location, leading to disk seeks and write amplification.
LSM stores address the need of serving the write-intensive workload, thanks to the design of append-only writes. Due to this reason, many LSM stores are adopted in practice. For outsourced data storage (A1), HBase [2] , Cassandra [1] and LevelDB [10] are commonly adopted in the stack of big-data systems and are used to store user-generated big-data content (e.g., tweets). For cryptocurrency (A2), Google's LSM store LevelDB [10] is widely adopted in the software stack of many cryptocurrency clients including Bitcoin core [19], Ethereum [6] , HyperLedger [18] , multichain/stream [21] , and other crypto-currencies.
However, in these real-world uses of LSM stores, data integrity is not treated in priority. Our application scenarios deal with security-sensitive data where data integrity is critical. For instance, suppose using an LSM store to serve certificate transparency without integrity guarantee. Returning a stale certificate (of a revoked public key) to a user may connect him/her to an impersonator (who steals the key), leading to security breaches. Returning a set of invalid transactions will establish an incorrect view of a lightweight (or more specifically simplified payment verification) Blockchain node, leading to wasted computation on mining. Thus, it motivates our work to harden the data integrity in existing LSM stores.
System Model
In our system model, a trusted application runs inside the enclave on an untrusted cloud platform. The trusted application manages security-sensitive big-data and relies on a key-value store interface in enclave for data storage. The trusted application emits a read/write workload with characteristic described above (i.e., write-intensive workloads). The interface between the trusted application and data storage is a standard one in key-value store, described in Equation 1. Given a key-value record k, v , a write request is PUT(k, v) and a read is v = GET(k). Here, we assume the enclave runs a timestamp manager that assigns to a read/write operation a unique timestamp reflecting the real time.
The trusted application can run in multiple threads and issues the PUT/GET operations concurrently.
Security Goals
The security goal of this work is primarily on query authenticity, while we also address data confidentiality in § 5.6 and § 4.1. The query authenticity describes that given a dataset, whether the result of a read reflects the latest state of the dataset. To formally describe our security goal, we present the threats and security definition below.
Threats: The adversary in our model is the untrusted host outside the enclave. The adversarial host runs operating systems and the instance of LSM store.
She can mount attacks to present forged query results to the enclave. Specifically, given a GET request, a malicious host can forge a fake result (breaking query-result integrity), or present a stale record (violating query freshness), or skip a legitimate record (violating query completeness). The definitions of these query-authenticity properties are described below.
Security definitions: Given a read k, v, ts = GET(k, tsq), the query authenticity includes various correctness properties: 1) Query integrity is about whether the read-result k, v, ts is a key-value record written by a legitimate write request before. If the read result is not written by the data owner, it violates the query integrity. 2) Query completeness is about whether a read result is complete. In case of point query (w.r.t. range query), the completeness is about the membership of a result and it prevents a legitimate record from being excluded in the result. For instance, if the store has a matching record to the read but it returns an empty result, the query completeness 3 is violated. 3) Query freshness states whether the result k, v, ts has the largest timestamp (or is the latest) among all records of the queried key k and with a timestamp smaller/earlier than tsq.
Design Motivation: Why LSM Tree based
Digest Structure?
To support query authentication (with membership), the conventional approach is building a single Merkle tree over the entire dataset and updating the Merkle tree "in place" upon data updates. This update-in-place Merkle tree design is widely adopted in real-world systems such as digesting state in Ethereum [7].
To serve write-intensive workloads, however, the update-in-place digesting approach would incur high performance overhead. Briefly, with small data records (e.g., tens or hundreds of bytes as in a "tweets"), the hash digests which themselves are tens of bytes can grow comparable with the size of dataset itself. They need to be stored on a large storage medium such as disk. With digests stored on disk, the update-in-place digest structures cause random disk accesses and thus impose high overhead to the write path.
In this work, we present a new digest structure based on an LSM tree, called eLSM digests, where the digests are updated in an append-only fashion. The motivation of this design is based on the well-known fact [78, 51, 74, 27] that the append-only design of an LSM tree leads to performance advantages when serving write-intensive workloads. While existing LSM trees are applied to the data-access path in a storage system, our proposed eLSM presents a new paradigm that applies the LSM tree on the security path, particularly for efficient digest accesses.
eLSM-P1: A STRAWMAN DESIGN
In this section, we present a straightforward design of LSM store with SGX and name it by eLSM-P1. We then analyze the performance to motivate our primary design eLSM-P2 presented in the next section. Design space: Recall that an LSM store is a user-space system that translates application-level data reads/writes to systems-level file reads/writes. To port an LSM store to SGX, in principle, one can place the code of the LSM store outside the enclave. That is, the LSM store runs in the untrusted world and the trusted application in enclave issues OCalls to send PUT/GET requests to the store. However, this code-outside-enclave design requires excluding "dynamically" updated memory data from enclave and incurs design complexity for data authentication. We dismiss this alternative design (more details in in Technical Report [23] ). In this work, we focus on building an LSM store with code inside an SGX enclave.
The eLSM-P1 Design
A strawman: We consider a strawman design, named eLSM-P1, that places the entire user-space codebase of an LSM store inside the enclave. The SSTable files are stored outside the enclave. The interaction between the enclave and the untrusted host occurs at the syscall levels, primarily for file management (e.g., fwrite and fread). Specifically, eLSM-P1 places outside the enclave the files at all LSM-tree levels, including the WAL file at level L0 and SSTables at levels L ≥1 . Inside the enclave, it runs the codebase of an LSM store and stores the intermediate data including indices and data buffers. The system architecture of eLSM-P1 is depicted in Figure 1 .
We implement a functional system prototype of eLSM-P1 on Google's LevelDB [10] . To port Google LevelDB to SGX, we use Intel SGX SDK and modify the LevelDB codebase to call SDK's syscalls.
Security analysis: eLSM-P1 provides security on data confidentiality and authenticity through SGX SDK's data-protection mechanism. That is, SDK encrypts and digests the content of SSTable files stored outside the enclave, which ensures that an adversary host cannot extract information from the file content (in the ciphertext format) and forge a file block (whose integrity is verified by the hash proof of file block). Note that we do not address the confidentiality under side-channel attacks in SGX.
Performance Analysis of eLSM-P1
In this subsection, we first present a performance analysis of eLSM-P1 that identifies performance problem serving a large dataset. We then use this observation to motivate our next design, eLSM-P2.
Observing eLSM-P1's performance: We first focus on analyzing the read path of eLSM-P1. Recall that on the read path of an LSM store, the CPU accesses disk-resident data by buffering it in memory. eLSM-P1 places the read buffers inside enclave, which may cause two performance problems: S1) The buffer in enclave incurs an extra data copy in the data-read path, that is, when the CPU accesses the data already buffered inside the untrusted memory, it creates a second data copy inside enclave. S2) When the in-enclave buffer grows large (e.g., beyond 128MB), it causes expensive enclave paging. For the common setting of disk-resident data, having a large read buffer is essential to the performance.
In order to quantify the performance slowdown caused by the in-enclave read buffer placement, we conduct a performance study based on our eLSM-P1 implementation. For comparison, we also implement the placement of read buffer outside enclave. This is done by allocating the read buffer of LSM store in the untrusted memory. In the performance study, we store 5 GB dataset (larger than untrusted memory) and drive a read-only workload that consists of reads of randomly distributed data keys. We vary the read buffer size 4 MB to 2048 MB. The read latency is reported in Figure 2 . The results show that when the data buffer is small, the in-enclave buffer incurs 2X latency of the out-enclave buffer. This performance difference is caused by the extra data copy in enclave (S1). When the data buffer is larger beyond 64 MB, the latency of accessing in-enclave buffer grows significantly and it incurs 4.5X latency. The performance slowdown of the large in-enclave buffer is due to the expensive enclave paging. This performance characteristic prompts us to place the memory buffers of an LSM store outside the enclave.
Motivating eLSM-P2 Design: The above performance observation suggests a favorable design by placing the read buffer of an LSM store outside the enclave. We propose eLSM-P2 as a holistic system that materializes the design of placing read buffer outside the enclave. The eLSM-P2 system features two placement strategies, that is, placing read buffer outside enclave and placing code and other memory (meta)data inside enclave.
Concretely, in eLSM-P2, the code of an LSM store runs inside the enclave, and it switches the execution out of the enclave only when serving system calls (e.g., file reads/writes). The enclave code accesses the data on the read path outside enclave, which includes read buffers and disk files. Other memory data is placed inside enclave, including the write buffer (at level L0) and file indices (at levels L ≥1 ). A common characteristic of data inside enclave is that they are meta-data in memory whose sizes are small enough (e.g., with file indices of a couple of megabytes, it can accommodate millions of files) and thus they can be safely placed in enclave without causing enclave paging. eLSM-P2 places only static memory data, that is, read buffers outside enclave, which significantly simplifies the complexity of a correct implementation. Table 1 summarizes design choices made in eLSM-P1 and eLSM-P2. Figure 3a depicts the system architecture of eLSM-P2 which runs the code for operations PUT,GET,COMPACTION inside enclave. The memory data including the buffer at Level L0 and file indices at Levels L ≥1 are also placed inside the enclave. The read buffers and all SSTable files at Levels L ≥1 are placed outside the enclave. The WAL file is also stored outside enclave. The figure also illustrates the dataset in the LSM store, which we will use throughout this section to describe the details of eLSM-P2 system. In this example dataset, there is an LSM tree of three levels and six key-value records. Level L1 contains record A, 9 , level L2 contains three records T, 4 , Z, 7 , Z, 6 and level L3 contains four records A, 2 , T, 0 , Y, 3 , Z, 1 . Here, we show the key-value record by its data key and timestamp. Record T, 0 is of data key T and timestamp 0, which is the oldest record. For simplicity, the data value is omitted in this example.
eLSM-P2 SYSTEM
Protecting data outside enclave: Because eLSM-P2 places outside enclave the data at non-zero levels, it entails data protection mechanisms. For data confidentiality, we require the data key in each record to be encrypted with deterministic encryption (DE), such that it can directly search the domain of ciphertext. We discuss the details of data confidentiality in § 5.6. For data authenticity, we build the eLSM digest structure to authenticate the data outside enclave, as described next.
Digest Structure
To digest an LSM tree, we propose a novel authenticated data structure, eLSM-P2 digests. There are two key designs: 1) eLSM-P2 builds a "forest" of Merkle trees, each digesting one LSM-tree level and each having its root stored in the enclave.
2) In a per-level Merkle tree, data records of the same key are digested in hash chains and records of different keys are digested in a Merkle tree. In particular, the hash chain is built in a temporal order where the chain header is the oldest record and the tail is the newest record. In Figure 3a , each of the three LSM tree levels is associated with a Merkle tree. Case 1): For a level of distinct data keys, such as level L3 in Figure 3a , it builds the leaf set of the Merkle tree directly on the data records. For instance, h7 = H( A, 2 ) (H is a standard cryptographic hash algorithm with variable-length input) and h6 = H( T, 0 ). An intermediate node is the hash digest of the concatenation of the two children, for instance, h8 = H(h6 h7). Case 2) For a level that contains some records of the same keys, it constructs a hash chain over these records. For instance, level L2 contains two records of the same key, Z, 7 and Z, 6 . eLSM-P2 builds a hash chain on these two records, that is, h4 = H( Z, 7 H( Z, 6 )). Then, it builds the Merkle tree over h4 (for records of key Z) and h2 (for record T, 4 ) for level L2.
To materialize the eLSM-P2 digest structure, we present a simple storage design: Given a level Li and its Merkle tree, each record at the level k, v is augmented with its eLSM-P2 proof π, that is, k, v πi Given a record, an eLSM-P2 proof is the set of Merkle tree nodes (or hashes) that surround the path from the leaf node of the record to the root node. For instance, in Figure 3a , the eLSM-P2 proof for record A, 2 consists of hashes h7 and h11 (which are the siblings to nodes h6 and h8).
Read/Write Protocol
Data read path starts with the trusted application issuing a read operation, v = GET(k). The enclave looks up its index to locate the target level and file, and it then notifies the eLSM-P2 store. r1
The untrusted store serves the read operation on the target file and, in addition, runs algorithm π, v = QUERY GET (m, k)) to prepare a proof for authenticating the read result. The proof consists of Merkle authentication paths or Merkle proofs [61] at "relevant" LSM tree levels. Recall that a Merkle authentication path consists of the hashes surrounding the path from a leaf to the root in a Merkle tree and it can be used to verify the membership and non-membership of a record in a dataset. r2 The eLSM-P2 store in the untrusted host then sends the result of GET (k) as well as the proofs (π) to the enclave. The enclave verifies the authenticity of the read result, by running algorithm Yes|No= VRFYGET (π, v)). The verification algorithm iterates through relevant levels, and, for each level, verifies the membership/non-membership of the queried data key (k) using the Merkle proof (in π) and locally stored root hash.
A strawman of designing the eLSM-P2 proof is to scan all levels to prepare a proof (in algorithm QUERY). We propose to reduce the proof size by including only Merkle proofs of the levels no higher than the level of the result record. This will allow algorithm QUERY to stop early when it reaches the first level, say Li, that finds a matching record. The returned proof π = π1, ...πi, where π1, ...πi−1 are the Merkle proofs for non-membership (there is not any matching record at levels L1, L2, ...Li−1). πi is the Merkle proof for membership (there is a matching record at level Li). All Merkle proofs after level Li, as will be seen, do not contain fresher records and are deliberately omitted. When there is no matching record, i = q.
An example: In Figure 3a , suppose the trusted application issues GET(Z) over dataset m. In step r1 , the untrusted host serves QUERY GET (m, Z) with authentic result Z, 7 (the benign case). Z, 7 is the newest record matching queried key Z and is located at level L2. The proof is two Merkle authentication paths at levels L1 and L2. Note that there is no need to include level L3 in the eLSM-P2 proof. Concretely, the proof at the first level is A, 9 (denoted by π1). The proof at the second level is h3, h2 (denoted by π2). Then in step r2 , the enclave can verify the result authenticity in freshness and completeness based on the proof π = [π1, π2] (i.e., algorithm VRFY([π1, π2], Z, 7 , [h1, h5])).
Concretely, with the first-level proof π1 = A, 9 , the enclave verifies result authenticity by checking H(π1) ? = h5. If the VRFY algorithm runs through, it authenticates the fact that record A, 9 is the only record at level L1. From this, it can be derived that level L1 does not contain any record of key Z (i.e., the non-membership of a data key Z at level L1). With the second-level proof π2 = h3, h2, the enclave verifies by checking H(h2 H( Z, 7 h3)) ? = h5. If successful, it authenticates the fact that a) record Z, 7 is a valid record at level L2 (result integrity), b) record Z, 7 is the newest record with key Z (result freshness). Fact b) is based on that there are no other records of key Z in the proof π2. Based on these two proofs, one can establish that record Z, 7 is the newest record in the dataset m.
Consider the malicious case when the untrusted host can return a stale record, say Z, 6 , to the enclave. In this case, the malicious host can only present the following as a valid level-L2 proof, that is, π ′ 2 = Z, 7 , h2. By this means, the enclave can verify the result integrity successfully by checking H(h2 H( Z, 7 H( Z, 6 ))) ? = h5. However, as the newer result record Z, 7 has to be included in the proof π2, the enclave can detect that Z, 6 is not the most fresh record (violating freshness).
Data write path starts with the trusted application issuing a write operation PUT(k, v). To serve the write, the enclave maintains two in-enclave structures, a write buffer of level L0 and, for data recovery, a digest of the write-ahead log (WAL). Recall that a WAL stores recent data writes in temporal order and serves as the base to recover recent data in the case of fault. The storage of WAL is placed outside the enclave, while the enclave stores the hash digests of the WAL.
w1 Serving the write PUT (k,v), the enclave first assigns to the record to write the latest timestamp ts. It then writes to the memory buffer of level L0 inside enclave. Serving a timestamped write PUT(k, v, ts), the enclave iteratively update its WAL digest by dig ′ = H(dig k, v, ts ). w2 When the write buffer at level L0 overflows, it is triggered to flush the content at Level L0 and to generate a file at Level L1. In the system of an LSM store, the codebase for flush is shared with that for COMPACTION.
w3 The enclave switches out to append the write to the WAL in the untrusted domain. Enclave WAL can be extended to defend rollback attacks, which will be described in § 5.7.
An example: In Figure 3a , suppose the application calls PUT(Y ). The enclave assigns to the record the latest timestamp 10. It updates the WAL digest from dig to dig', such that dig ′ = H(dig Y, 10 )) ( w1 ). The host appends the record to the WAL outside enclave ( w3 ). If the buffer of Level L0 is overflown by the new record, it will sort all records stored in L0, and flush them to a new file at L1 ( w2 ).
COMPACTION path starts with the trusted application in enclave issuing operation (L ′ i , L ′ i+1 ) = COMPACTION(Li, Li+1). For simplicity, we consider the most basic form of COMPACTION, namely, merging two adjacent levels. It is natural to extend it to more complicated cases such as merging more than two levels or merging subsets at the two levels. For the COMPACTION across two levels, eLSM-P2 carries out the computation inside enclave and only switches the execution outside enclave for file access.
The process runs in the following steps: m1 the enclave starts to issue OCalls to load all input files to untrusted memory so that the enclave can read the streams of data records (in their sorted order). m2 The enclave then runs "authenticated COMPACTION" that merges input data at the two levels into one level. Internally, the enclave needs to verify the authenticity of input data, to conduct the actual computation for COMPACTION, to produce the digest of output data, and to generate the proofs embedded in the output data. We will describe in § 5.5.2 the detailed system design of the authenticated COMPACTION in enclave. m3 The untrusted host makes effect of the COMPACTION by flushing merged data and proof to disk. The enclave updates the per-level digests by the newly produced ones.
An example: In Figure 3a , suppose the application calls COMPACTION(L2, L3). In step m1 , the host loads the data at the two levels from disk to memory (in the untrusted world). In step m2 , the enclave verifies the data authenticity of input levels by reconstructing the Merkle tree at level L2 (and L3) and by checking if its root hash is equal with h5 (and h12). It will then merge the two levels' data into one merged list, that is, from L2 = [ T, 4 , Z, 7 , Z, 6 ] and L3 = [ A, 2 , T, 0 , Y, 3 , Z, 1 ] to output level L ′ 3 = [ A, 2 , T, 4 , T, 0 , Y, 3 , Z, 7 , Z, 6 , Z, 1 ]. Meanwhile, it builds the Merkle tree over the output list, and based on it, generates the proofs embedded in data records. In step m3 , the digest of the new Merkle tree replaces that of level L3 (i.e., h12). L2 becomes an empty list and its digest is updated as well.
Protocol Analysis
In this subsection we present the security analysis of the eLSM-P2 protocol. We first define the record freshness as below: The protocol security is defined as below: THEOREM 5.3. (Protocol security) Given a GET operation, if the enclave completes the VRFY algorithm successfully, the GET result is correct and fresh (as in Definition 5.1).
Security analysis:
We prove the protocol security by contradiction. Assume there exists an adversary who can forge a proof on a stale (yet correct) 4 record on which the VRFY algorithm completes successfully. Logically, there are two cases for a stale record: 1) The record is stale at the level that contains it, 2) The record is fresh at the level that contains it but there are more fresh records at other levels. In the following, we prove the contradiction that the VRFY algorithm successfully completes on a stale record, respectively in the two cases.
For Case 1), suppose there is another record k, v ′ , ts ′ on the same level with result record k, v, ts but fresher, that is, ts < ts ′ . The COMPACTION in enclave guarantees 5 that the two records are sorted by timestamps (note that they are of the same data key) and the eLSM-P2 builds a hash chain over them. More specifically, H( k, v ′ , ts ′ ...H ( k, v, ts ...)). In other words, the fresh record k, v ′ , ts ′ is among the neighbors of the path from the stale record k, v, ts to the Merkle root node (think for an example, Z, 7 is the neighbor of the path from Z, 6 to root as in Figure 3b ). In order for the adversary to forge a proof that can be verified successfully, she either breaks the security of cryptographic hashes (1a) or has to include all the neighbors of the path from itself to the root (1b). The former case (1a) is hard to any computationally bounded adversary (more formally, probabilistic polynomial time adversary). In the latter case (1b), the fresher record included in the neighbors is exposed to the enclave who will not pass the freshness check in the VRFY algorithm as it can simply detect that the result record is not fresh (e.g., Z, 7 has a larger timestamp and is fresher than Z, 6 ). Therefore, the VRFY algorithm cannot complete successfully on a stale record. A contradiction is found in Case 1.
For Case 2), suppose the result record k, v, ts resides at level Li and there exists a fresher record k, v ′ , ts ′ stored at another level Lj. There are two cases: 2a) j < i and 2b) j > i. For Case 2a), successfully passing VRFY algorithm in eLSM-P2, it requires a non-membership proof of data key k at level Lj. This contradicts the assumption that Lj does contain a record of key k, namely k, v ′ , ts ′ . For Case 2b), eLSM-P2 does not require including any proof for the levels with index higher than i (recall that given a GET result residing at level Li, an eLSM-P2 proof includes Merkle proofs for levels L1, L2, ...Li but excludes the ones on any higher levels Li+1, Li+2, ...). The following lemma guarantees that those levels higher than Li (i.e., with larger index values) cannot include any records fresher than k, v, ts .
LEMMA 5.4. In eLSM-P2 with the in-enclave COMPACTION, a record residing at a lower level must have a larger timestamp than any record of the same data key at a higher level. That is, given any two records of the same data key, say k, v, ts residing at level Li and k, v ′ , ts ′ at level L i ′ , it holds that i < i ′ if and only if ts > ts ′ .
For instance, in Figure 3a , at any level, say L3, records are sorted, from key A to T to Z. Lemma 5.4 requires that in Figure 3a , an older record A with timestamp 2 is stored on a higher level L3 than the level a newer record A, 9 is stored (which is level L1). To prove Lemma 5.4, the key intuition is that eLSM-P2 only allows moving key-value records from lower levels to higher levels, but not in the reversed order.
Meta-data authenticity: In our implementation, meta-data including Bloom filters, file indices, etc. are placed inside enclaves. The metadata authenticity is protected by the enclave.
Range-Query Protocol
Processing Range Query: eLSM-P2 supports range query processing with completeness. Given a queried key range, it iterates through all levels (unlike the case of exact-match query) and for each level, the untrusted world presents the range-query proof from the Merkle tree at the level.
Within one level, the range proof is constructed by treating the Merkle tree as a segment tree which is a classic data structure in computational geometry. A segment tree is essentially a full binary tree where each intermediate tree node represents a segment (or interval of data keys). Given a range query L, the segment tree can present 2 log L intermediate nodes, whose segments are union-ed to cover range L [97] . Based on this view, eLSM constructs a range proof by the sibling nodes of the segments covering the queried range.
For instance, suppose in Figure 3 , a range query is SCAN([S, U ]) against Level L3. The query proof will include 1) records which fall in or enclose the range, that is, T, 0 , Y, 3 , Z, 1 , 2) the range proof that authenticates these records, that is, h6. At level L3, the segment union that covers the three records includes intermediate tree nodes h11 and h7. Their siblings are h6 and h8. While h8 can be reconstructed from T, 0 and h6, it can be omitted, leave the range proof to be h6. In this case, a query verifier can authenticate the query completeness, as records T, 0 , Y, 3 , Z, 1 are authenticated and they consecutive in the leaf set of the Merkle tree.
Security Analysis (Completeness): The range-query proof authenticates query completeness. Informally, the security can be derived from the following facts: 1) The hash functions used in Merkle tree are collision resistant. 2) The data records in a level are sorted by data keys. 3) The records in the query proof form a range of data keys that cover the range in the query.
System Implementation
We have implemented eLSM-P2 on Google LevelDB [10] and Facebook RocksDB [9] . RocksDB is itself built atop LevelDB with richer programming interfaces. In this subsection, we present the detailed implementation of eLSM-P2 on these two LSM stores.
In the protocol of eLSM-P2, a key-value record is stored with its proof, that is, k, v πi , where i is the index of the level where the record is currently located. Implementing the embedded proof in an LSM store, it requires to add the code change in two paths, that is, a) the COMPACTION paths for updating records' proof when they are merged to a different level (Note that the proof is sensitive to which level the record is located), and b) the GET path where the proof is used to authenticate the record membership/non-membership in a level. Next, we present the code change on the GET path in § 5.5.1, and then present that on the COMPACTION path in § 5.5.2.
Query Verification in Read Path
The code change on the GET path serves two purpose: First, for the data stored in the untrusted world, eLSM-P2 needs to present non-membership proofs for the levels that do not have a matching record. Instead of returning null for non-membership levels, eLSM-P2 returns the two neighboring records whose keys are smaller and larger than the queried key. For instance, in Figure 3a , when it queries GET(k = B) on level L3, it returns records A, 2 and T, 0 (with their eLSM-P2 proofs).
Second, inside the enclave, eLSM-P2 requires implementing the VRFY algorithm to verify the query authenticity given a proof. Note that the proof can be directly extracted from the result record returned from the untrusted part of eLSM-P2. Support mmap reads: LevelDB supports the data reads in two ways: Read through a user-space read buffer and read through mmap'ed files. eLSM implementation over LevelDB supports both read paths in LevelDB. On the buffer-based read path, eLSM-P2 allows the enclave code to access the buffer outside enclave and let the untrusted code manage the buffer for eviction. On the mmap-based read path, it switches out of enclave, upon opening a file, to mmap the file to the untrusted memory. Then the enclave code directly accesses the mmap'ed file in the untrusted memory.
Authenticated COMPACTION
Recall that eLSM-P2 runs the COMPACTION computation inside enclave by accessing data from the untrusted world. For data authenticity, the in-enclave COMPACTION need to be augmented with three extra steps: a) Before the COMPACTION, the enclave authenticates the input data read from the untrusted world. b) After the COMPACTION, the enclave needs to digest the output data and stores the digest in enclave. c) In the end, it generates from the output Merkle tree the proofs embedded in individual data records.
Integrating the COMPACTION authentication with the underlying LSM store (i.e., LevelDB and RocksDB) is realized by implementing some event handlers. In general, these LSM stores run the compaction process that consists of various internal events. Two events are of particular interest to our implementation, that is, Filter() and OnFileCreated(). Event Filter() occurs whenever the compaction produces a data record. Event OnFileCreated() occurs whenever the compaction (or other procedure like flush) produces a new file on disk. In RocksDB, these two events are exposed in its callback functions. In LevelDB, we add hooks in the LevelDB codebase to expose them to applications. The pseudo-code that implements authenticated COMPACTION by the two callbacks is depicted in Figure 4 . eLSM-P2 runs the codebase of LSM store and the implemented callback functions in enclave. Steps a) and b): In Filter(), it constructs two types of Merkle trees, respectively for the input files and the output file. Given a key-value record, it parses the file name and level information from the value field and then updates the input Merkle tree at the corresponding level (Line 20 in Figure 4 ). It also builds an output Merkle tree for the level the compaction output is located (Line 21). When the compaction finishes, it checks the equality of the Merkle root hash stored in enclave and the root hashes of the input Merkle trees reconstructed. If the equality check passes, it then makes effect the Merkle root hash for the output file (Line 36-39).
Step c): In OnFileCreated(), it embeds the Merkle proof in the individual data records in the output file.
Merkle tree construction: Constructing a Merkle tree is a primitive operation in eLSM-P2, specifically for authenticating the input and output of a COMPACTION. The Merkle tree in our scheme is constructed incrementally with the arrival of records in the input/output data stream. That is, when a data record arrives, the enclave checks if the record shares the data key with the previous record. If this is the case, the enclave build a hash chain on the previous record. Otherwise, it will incrementally builds a Merkle tree. For instance, in Figure 3b , upon reading the output record T, 4 , the enclave checks if the previous record (i.e., T, 0 ) has the same data key. Since the two records are of the same key, it then builds a hash chain over them. In the next iteration when the output record Y, 3 arrives, the previous record (i.e., T, 4 ) has a different data key, it then treats as a leaf of the Merkle tree the hash of previous record, namely h3.
Our implementation retain the COMPACTION features in the vanilla LSM store, including versioning policies, tombstone delete, etc. Details about supporting these features in authenticated COMPACTION are described in Technical Report [23] .
Multi-threading: eLSM-P2 supports concurrent operations in a multi-threaded enclave. For concurrent reads/writes in MemTable at Level L0, eLSM-P2 implementation relies on the synchronization support (i.e., mutex and condition variables) Concurrent reads on upper levels L ≥1 can be processed in parallel without synchronization.
Concurrent COMPACTION with reads/writes need to be synchronized, as is in LevelDB. For instance, when an SSTable produced by a COMPACTION replaces an old SSTable at the same level, the replacement operation needs to be synchronized with any pending read on the old file. This type of synchronization in eLSM-P2 is realized by checks during query verification VRFY, such that a read before/after the file replacement can only be verified successfully with the Merkle hash of the old/new SSTable file. To implement this, the file replacement outside enclave synchronously calls into the enclave (through a blocking ECall) in order to update the file hash maintained inside the enclave. When a GET operation returns (which is potentially executed in parallel with a COMPACTION), the enclave verifies its result against the latest file hash (updated by the COMPACTION) in the enclave. We use an in-enclave mutex to guard the file hash under concurrent hash updates (from file replacement in a COMPACTION) and hash reads (for verifying a GET operation).
Data Confidentiality
In eLSM, data confidentiality is handled by adding an encryption layer on top. With a symmetric encryption, eLSM encrypts data keys when receiving PUT/GET requests from the application enclave and decrypt data when returning results (i.e., data value in GET) to the applications. That is,
Here, the symmetric key, sk, is used for both encryption and decryption. It is securely stored in the enclave. In addition, we use a deterministic encryption scheme (DE) [36, 52] to support the exact-match query (in GET). Because DE has weaker security than the standard encryption, we limit DE to be used for encrypting data keys. The data value in a key-value record is encrypted using the standard probabilistic encryption (e.g., AES) that is semantically secure [52] .
Concretely, in eLSM-P2, the trusted application deterministic-encrypts a data key and sends the ciphertext of the data key in the PUT/GET requests to eLSM. It then conducts the buffer lookups based on the data-key ciphertext. In the case of buffer miss, it finds the target level, file name, and file block based on the data-key ciphertext.
In eLSM-P1, it relies on the native file-encryption provided by SGX SDK (see Figure 1 ). The data blocks in the encrypted file are looked up based on the cleartext of data key (unlike in eLSM-P2).
In both designs, the files store the ciphertext of key-value records in a sorted order. The access sequence, that is, the indices of the data blocks being accessed, is disclosed to the untrusted host, which may reveal the relative order of data keys being accessed. In general, this work does not address the access-pattern side-channel security, for which existing works [76, 26] can provide complementary supports.
In our implementation, we used the Intel SDK function SGX_RIJNDAEL128GCM_ENCRYPT [16] with an empty IV (initialization vector) to encrypt each record. We have tested that in this setting, the repeated encryption (of the same plaintext and secret key) produces the same ciphertext. Thus we believe the use of an empty IV gives us a deterministic encryption scheme.
Confidentiality in range query: To support range queries with confidentiality, we use Order-Preserving Encryption (OPE) [71] where the ciphertext preserves the ordering of plaintext data. By this means, the enclave can search the OPE ciphertext of the queried range over the OPE ciphertext of the data records buffered in the untrusted memory. In other words, the enclave runs the same range-query code in the vanilla (and unsecured) key-value store.
Discussion: Freshness and Rollback Attacks
In a rollback attack, the untrusted host can replace the authenticated data storage with an older but also authenticated version. To detect and defend the rollback attack, we can harden the security of eLSM systems (both eLSM-P1 and eLSM-P2) with a trusted monotonic counter. A trusted monotonic counter provides the state freshness across power cycles. In reality, one can build a trusted monotonic counter on TPM chips (e.g., the SDK sgx_create_monotonic_counter service [14] or others [84, 59] based on Intel Management Engine (ME) [13]) or multiple remote enclaves (e.g., as in ROTE [59] ). Given a trusted monotonic counter, the eLSM would periodically write the hash of current dataset across all levels to the counter. This hash can be implemented by the static hash of all non-zero levels (updated only when it merges) and the hash of WAL file. By this means, one can guarantee the freshness of entire dataset across power cycles against rollback attacks. The dataset-wide freshness can derive the query freshness.
To reduce the performance impact, one can allocate a write buffer for logging the monotonic counter. The size of the write buffer is tunable by system administrator.
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we present the performance evaluation of eLSM-P2 and eLSM-P1 using YCSB benchmarking tools [44] .
Experiment Design and Setup
Setup: In our experiments, we use a laptop equipped with an SGX CPU. Specifically, the hardware specs include an Intel 8-core i7-6820HK CPU of 2.70 GHz with 8 MB cache, a 16 GB RAM and 1 TB disk.
We run our experiments in the YCSB framework [44] . We use YCSB to both generate the workload and to execute the experiments. YCSB framework works in two phases: the load phase when it initializes the system by populating the dataset, and the evaluation phase when it drives the target workload to the system and measures the performance. When initializing each experiment, we typically scan the loaded dataset so that it is loaded in the untrusted memory. By this means, we mainly consider the setting of memory-resident data with size ranging from several hundreds of megabytes to four gigabytes.
We port the open-source LevelDB-YCSB adapter [25] to the SGX architecture. This is done by running the YCSB platform in the untrusted world and wrap each PUT/GET request as an ECall (as in SGX SDK) into the enclave. Inside the enclave, we run the YCSB measurement code that measures various performance metrics.
Baseline: Eleos-sorted array: We implement a baseline of an in-memory data store. In this in-memory store, the entire dataset is stored in enclave as a sorted array. For implementation, we use Eleos [64] , a state-of-the-art virtual memory management engine in enclave without calling expensive enclave paging. Their approach, briefly, is to monitor all memory references and to relocate data between enclave and untrusted memory. We implement a sorted array in enclave linked with Eleos. The array serves data reads with binary search and is updated "in place". For fair comparison, the data in Eleos-sorted array is persisted to disk periodically. This is done by maintaining a write buffer storing recent data updates and switching out enclave (through an OCall) for data persistence on disk.
Overall Performance under YCSB (Macro-benchmark)
We present the performance result of eLSM under YCSB. In this set of experiments, we vary the workloads in terms read-write ratio, key distribution, etc. and evaluate eLSM performance. The purpose is to present a holistic view regarding the performance of eLSM-P1 and eLSM-P2.
To conduct the experiments, we fix the initial dataset at 3 GB. In the evaluation phase, we drive millions of operations to the key-value store for performance measurement. We use the uniform distribution to generate the dataset and queries. We turn on the default compaction strategy. By this means, we conduct a series of experiments with varying the read-write ratio of the workload. Each experiment is run for three times and the average performance metric and standard deviation are reported. The operation latency of eLSM-P1 and eLSM-P2 under varying read-write ratios are shown in Figure 5a . The result shows that eLSM-P2 outperforms eLSM-P1 in most workloads except for a small set of write-only workloads. Specifically, as the workload becomes more read intensive, eLSM-P2 (with the mmap configuration as described in § 5.5.1) has its operation latency decreased. This performance characteristic is due to that eLSM-P2 has to cause disk IO for data persistence on the write path while on the read path it can read the memory (through the mmap files). As the workload transitions from writes to reads, eLSM-P1's latency first increases and then decreases near the end. The increase of latency is caused by overflowing the enclave memory (of 128 MB) and enclave paging, as will be validated in other experiments (e.g., in Figure 6a ).
Comparing eLSM-P2 and eLSM-P1, when the workload is write-only, eLSM-P1 is faster. For most workloads, eLSM-P2 has a smaller operation latency than eLSM-P1, and the performance discrepancy reaches the highest when the workload consists of 70% reads (Note the uniform key distribution in this workload). In this setting, eLSM-P2 achieves 4.5X performance speedup comparing eLSM-P1. This performance result clearly supports the design tradeoff made in eLSM-P1 and eLSM-P2, where eLSM-P2 optimizes the read path by placing the read buffer outside enclave and avoiding enclave paging, which inevitably causes the write overhead, including authenticating COMPACTION and embedding eLSM-P2 proofs in the software layer. eLSM-P1 does not have such write overhead (data security is provided by the hardware-level memory protection in SGX). From the performance result, it can be seen that the eLSM-P2's design to trade off write performance for read is worthwhile, as the majority of workloads favors eLSM-P2.
The second experiment is to report the operation latency under varying data sizes. We initialize the system with data of varying sizes from 0.6 GB to 3 GB. In the evaluation phase, we drive into the system YCSB workload A which consists of 50% reads and 50% writes with data keys generated following a Zipfian distribution. We measure the operation latency for eLSM-P2 (in mmap configuration), eLSM-P1 and the baseline of Eleos-sorted array. The result is shown in Figure 5b . With the increasing data sizes, Eleos can scale only to 1 GB data which is limited by their open-source project [8, 64] . The discrepancy between the latency of eLSM-P2 and eLSM-P1 increases, which reaches a maximal of 7X difference when the data size is 3 GB. We suspect the peculiar shape of eLSM-P2 may be due to the data distribution and non-deterministic nature of running COMPACTION. Figure 5c presents the operation latency when the workload is generated with different key distributions. YCSB provides three common distribution for generating data keys, that is, Uniform, Zipfian and Latest. Among the three, Latest is the key distribution that has the best temporal locality (as it tends to read the latest inserted records), leading to smaller working sets. In this experiment, we use an initial dataset of 3 GB. In general, eLSM-P2 is less sensitive to key distribution than eLSM-P1. Under the uniform distribution, eLSM-P1 causes the highest operation latency. Because the working set size is the largest when data keys are generated uniformly, and it causes the highest memory pressure in enclave in eLSM-P1's design.
Read Performance
This set of experiments evaluate the read performance of eLSM-P2 and eLSM-P1. We initialize the storage system with datasets of varying sizes from 8 MB to 3 GB. We then drive a read-only workload of one million GET requests and measure the latency of these requests. In addition to Eleos-sorted array, we consider another baseline that was mentioned in our initial performance study (in Figure 2 ). The baseline places the read buffers outside the enclave (similar to eLSM-P2) but does not have the data-authentication measures including the eLSM Merkle trees and proofs (unlike eLSM-P2). This baseline is thus unsecured but it serves to show the ideal performance. We use the mmap configuration in eLSM-P2 which allows for accessing files pinned in memory.
The read latency is presented in Figure 6a . When the data size is smaller than the enclave memory size (i.e., smaller than 128 MB), eLSM-P1 and the baseline of Eleos-sorted array perform better than eLSM-P2 because eLSM-P2 incurs proof and verification in the software layer. When the data size grows beyond the enclave memory (i.e., larger than 128 MB), eLSM-P2 outperforms eLSM-P1 and Eleos-sorted array. Again, Eleos limits the data scalability to 1 GB data. The longer latency in Eleos may be caused by the overhead for runtime monitoring and extra data copy in enclave memory. eLSM-P2 generally keeps the read latency constant with the increasing data size.
On the read path, eLSM-P2 can support both mmap files and a user-space buffer. Note that eLSM-P1 cannot support mmap files as such files must reside in the kernel-space memory outside the enclave. We compare the performance of mmap read and buffer-based read in eLSM-P2. The result is in Figure 6b . As data grows, the performance advantages of mmap configuration in eLSM-P2 become more clear. At the largest data scale tested, eLSM-P2 with mmap achieves 5X speedup of read latency comparing with the read buffer configuration.
We also compare eLSM-P2 (the buffer configuration) with eLSM-P1 under varying buffer sizes. Both eLSM-P2 (buffer) and eLSM-P1 support user-space memory buffers and this experiment is intended for a more fair comparison. In the experiment, we fix the data size to be 2 GB and vary the buffer size from 32 MB to 2 GB. The result is in Figure 6c . It can be seen that eLSM-P2 stays constant with increasing buffer size (Note that the data size is fixed and this is a different setting from the previous experiment in Figure 6b ) and eLSM-P1's read latency increases sharply around 128 MB data size. In general, eLSM-P2 (buffer) achieves 1.6X ∼ 2.3X speedups against eLSM-P1. This set of experiments measure the write performance of eLSM-P2 and eLSM-P1. In the experiments, we initialize the system with dataset of varying sizes from 0.2 GB to 4 GB. In the evaluation phase, we measure the write latency. For eLSM-P2 and eLSM-P1, we consider the configurations with and without COMPACTION. We also consider the baseline of Eleos-sorted array.
The write performance with COMPACTION is reported in Figure 7a . We report as the write latency the average execution time of running an PUT request plus the time for COMPACTION amortized to the individual PUT. Among the three approaches, eLSM-P1 is the fastest on the write path. With COMPACTION turned on, eLSM-P2's write latency is about 1.3X ∼ 2.3X of that in eLSM-P1. Eleos-sorted array is the slowest and can only scale to the data size of 1 GB. Because in both eLSM-P2 and eLSM-P1, the memory footprint in the write path is limited to a small write buffer (of 4 MB), whereas the Eleos-sorted array is an update-in-place structure with the working set size equal to the data size. Even without hardware-level enclave paging (as is optimized out by Eleos), the update-in-place structure still incurs a large amount of memory copies across the enclave boundary, leading to a higher write latency than eLSM-P2 and eLSM-P1.
We also compare the write performance with and without COMPACTION. The result is presented in Figure 7b . It can be seen that turning on COMPACTION, it causes 2X ∼ 4X slowdown on the write path. In both cases, namely with and without COMPACTION, eLSM-P2 has a higher write latency than eLSM-P1. This is due to the overhead caused by building the embedded proof in eLSM-P2.
RELATED WORK
Software Systems on SGX: Since the release of Intel SGX, there has been a large body of research on building software systems on SGX. The existing works have addressed the in-enclave support for OS (e.g., Haven [34] , Graphene-SGX [88] , SCONE [31] , and Panoply [82] ), security applications [56] , side-channel attacks [91, 41, 50, 38, 54] and defenses [80, 81, 43] , databases [77, 62, 72, 98, 33] , etc.
In particular, there is a line of research on building key-value stores in enclave.
Pesos [53] supports the secure hosting of a key-value store where the enclave enforces fine-grained access-control policies. SecureKeeper [40] secures ZooKeeper style coordination services hosted in the public cloud. Their approach is to confine the computation of user-provided data in enclave and to encrypt data in transit. Eleos [64] supports in-memory key-value stores and particularly addresses the problem of fitting in enclave data larger than 128 MB. They provide a virtual-memory abstraction in enclave and optimize out the expensive enclave paging by monitoring user-space memory accesses and by relocating data dynamically between the enclave memory and untrusted memory. HardIDX [48] is a secure index in enclave that seals external data using authenticated encryption [52] . Concerto [30] supports concurrent key-value stores with consistency guarantees. It is based on a novel design to check strong consistency by leveraging homomorphic secure hash with enclave. Shieldstore [85] supports in-memory key-value stores by placing data outside enclave and by running inside enclave an engine for record-grained encryption and integrity-checking. Shieldstore does not support data persistence or LSM tree.
LSM Storage Systems: bLSM [78] optimizes the LSM tree performance by row-based data storage and fine-grained compaction. Prior work [51] minimizes the write amplification under the skewed key access pattern. Pebble [74] reduces the write amplification by organizing storage layout in skip lists and avoiding data rewriting in the same level. Accordion [37] applies the principle of LSM tree to the memory management in order to solve the write amplification caused by frequent compaction. Compaction is critical to the performance of LSM tree storage. Existing work studies distributed compaction management in a cluster setting [27] . Beyond disk storage, the LSM tree has been applied for main-memory databases with high compression rate [95] , on non-volatile memory [57] , and for spatial databases in the AsterixDB project [28] . Concurrency of the LSM tree is studied in cLSM [49] that supports snapshot scan, conditional update, and concurrent COMPACTION.
CONCLUSION
This paper presents a novel SGX-based LSM key-value store to address emerging application needs of authenticating data under frequent updates. The proposed eLSM-P2 system places memory buffers outside enclave for efficiency. It authenticates the data with small proofs at selective levels of an LSM tree. Implementation on LevelDB and RocksDB is presented. The performance studies with YCSB workloads show a 4.5X speedup of eLSM-P2 over the baseline of eLSM-P1.
